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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The area of corporate disregard2 has a poor reputation for certainty of 
reasoning and is often dismissed as “jurisprudence by metaphor or epithet.”3  
In this paper we present results from an empirical study of the relationship 
between rationale and outcome within UK corporate disregard case law. The 
paper begins by examining academic and judicial perceptions of the problems 
within the doctrine of corporate disregard. We then proceed to describe the 
methodology of our study, which features an initial dataset of 909 UK 
corporate disregard cases from 1885 up to and including 2014 that was filtered 
into a final dataset of 213 cases. Each case within our dataset was then read 
carefully to determine the rationales instrumental to a court’s ultimate decision 
whether or not to disregard the corporate form. 
Overall we did not find a fundamental rationale that operated consistently 
across all applications of corporate disregard.  However, Façade/Sham/Shell, 
Agency, and Deception appear to form a core triad of rationales that amounted 
to necessary elements in a significant number of disregard adjudications. 
Control/Domination was also an important rationale in a large number of 
cases, but notable for the uncertainty of its adjudication. We also observed an 
                                                     
2 Veil/lifting/parting/tearing/peeping etc are used somewhat indiscriminately at times 
within the case law to describe an action that affects or arguably affects the principle established 
in Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 concerning the separateness of a corporation and its 
shareholders.  In this paper we use the earlier term ‘corporate disregard,’ meaning a decision 
where what is at stake is whether the presumption of separate corporate personality should be 
upheld or disregarded. E.M. Dodd, ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 
HLR 1145, 1146. 
3 P Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups:  Procedural Problems in the Law of Parent 
and Subsidiary Corporations (1983) 8; see also Yukong Line Ltd. of Korea v Rendsburg Inv. 
Corp. of Liberia [1998] 1 W.L.R. 294, 305 (Q.B.) (“For metaphor can be used to illustrate a 
principle; it may also be used as a substitute for analysis and may therefore obscure reasoning . 
. . .”). 
 important overlapping cluster containing the rationales Façade/Sham/Shell, 
Agency and Statutory Interpretation legitimized by the Court of Appeal 
decision in Adams v Cape Industries in 1990; specifically, after that decision 
was issued, Façade/Sham/Shell increased as an instrumental rationale within 
cases in our dataset, while Injustice, which the Adams court dismissed as an 
illegitimate rationale, is notable for its persistence.  
Within our dataset we found that the doctrine’s reputation for uncertainty 
and volatility in judicial adjudication was undeserved in general.  Instead, that 
reputation seems to have more traction with the low frequency rationales and 
a small number of higher frequency ones. For example, Control/Domination 
appears frequently within cases but is adjudicated quite uncertainly. Although 
instrumental on a comparatively less frequent basis, Statutory Interpretation 
and Injustice are highly unstable in terms of disregard outcomes. While both 
Statutory Interpretation and Injustice contain an obvious broad discretion for 
the judiciary in interpreting these rationale, the uncertainty surrounding 
Control/Domination is puzzling. As a rationale it lends itself strongly to 
concrete evidence, yet in terms of outcome behaves more like a metaphorical 
rationale. This may warrant the judiciary developing more certain criteria for 
establishing Control/Domination.  
In analyzing the rationales by jurisdiction we found disregard rates broadly 
higher at the Intermediate Appellate level than at Trial or Supreme Court level. 
However, when broken down by frequency of rationale, we found a high 
degree of certainty focused on upholding the corporate form. That dichotomy 
is explained by two high frequency rationales, Control/Domination and 
Deception, that had an unusual degree of uncertainty of adjudication at the 
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Intermediate Appellate level, while Injustice was also a notable low frequency 
driver of disregard outcomes at the Intermediate Appellate level. Low 
frequency rationales were again broadly uncertain but tilted towards disregard. 
When viewed by substantive claims, apart notably from the Adams rationales 
of Agency and Façade/Sham/Shell, the disregard rates appeared to have a 
stronger link to the underlying substantive claim than the rationale expressed, 
which may indicate an obscured rationale is operating which may form part of 
the areas reputation for obscurity.  
If one views corporate disregard as a chameleon-like doctrine in need of a 
single unifying judicial rationale then this study will disappoint. The doctrine 
of corporate disregard, perhaps by design and certainly in application, assumes 
a much more complex form within our dataset.  We found a key cluster of 
rationales that operate with a broad degree of certainty of judicial adjudication 
and consistency of outcome. Overall, in our opinion, much of the reputation 
for confusion in the area is unwarranted and may be due to the uncertainty 
present in Control/Domination, Statutory Interpretation, low frequency 
rationales, particularly Injustice, and the substantive claim link. If reform is 




A.  Doctrinal Foundations 
While the beginnings of corporate disregard lie in earlier cases than 
 Salomon v Salomon4 the differences in outcome in that decision between the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords is a critical part of the doctrinal 
foundation of disagreement about the underlying judicial perception of what 
might justify disregarding the corporate form. In finding that the company was 
but a ‘sham’ and a mere ‘alias’ or agent for Mr Salomon, Kay LJ considered 
that: 
[t]he statutes were intended to allow seven or more persons 
…to limit their liability under certain conditions and to 
become a corporation. But they were not intended to legalise 
a pretended association for the purpose of enabling an 
individual to carry on his own business with limited liability 
in the name of a joint stock company. 
 
In doing so the Court of Appeal read into the statute a “bona fides” requirement 
at a time when the judiciary could not refer to Parliamentary debates to 
determine what Parliament intended. When the case went to the House of 
Lords, Lord Halsbury in a literalist judgment critical of both individual Court 
of Appeal judges and their overall approach considered:  
My Lords, the truth is that the learned judges have never 
allowed in their own minds the proposition that the company 
has a real existence. They have been struck by what they have 
considered the inexpediency of permitting one man to be in 
influence and authority the whole company; and, assuming 
that such a thing could not have been intended by the 
Legislature, they have sought various grounds upon which 
they might insert into the Act some prohibition of such a 
result. Whether such a result be right or wrong, politic or 
impolitic, I say, with the utmost deference to the learned 
judges, that we have nothing to do with that question if this 
company has been duly constituted by law; and, whatever may 
be the motives of those who constitute it, I must decline to 
                                                     
4 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22. C. Mitchell, ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil:  An Empirical 
Study’ (1999) 3 Company Financial & Insolvency L Rev 15., 
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insert into that Act of Parliament limitations which are not to 
be found there.5  
In the decades leading up to the 1960s the Salomon decision firmly 
embedded itself due to the absence of the possibility of overruling a decision 
of the House of Lords, and so the differing judicial views as to the legitimate 
use of the corporate form lay buried. The seeds of later categories of corporate 
disregard were emerging in Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne,6 where a former 
employee who was bound by a covenant not to solicit customers from his 
former employers set up a company to do so. The court found that the company 
was but a front for Mr Horne and issued an injunction. This category would 
emerge in the 1960s in the case of Jones v Lipman7 as allowing the courts to 
disregard the corporation where the company was a “mere façade concealing 
the true facts”.8 Similarly in 1939 in Smith, Stone & Knight v Birmingham 
Corp9 the court set out a concept of agency as an exception to the Salomon 
principle that would reappear throughout the Century.  
By the late 1960s judicial tensions around older established precedents 
such as Salomon began to emerge in the aftermath of the changes to the rules 
of the Supreme Court in 1966,10 whereby the House of Lords could overrule 
its previous decisions. In 1969 the Court of Appeal in Littlewoods Mail Order 
Stores v IRC11 expressed a clear broad watching brief over the Salomon 
                                                     
5 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 at 33-34. See also E McGaughey, 'Donoghue v 
Salomon in the High Court' (2011) 4 Journal of Personal Injury Law 249 
6 Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch. 935. 
7 Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 
8 See also Re Bugle Press (1961). 
9 Smith, Stone, & Knight Ltd. v Birmingham Corp. [1939] 4 All ER 116. 
10 The Practice Statement [1966] 3 All ER 77. 
11 Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd. v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1969] 1 WLR 
1241. “[t]he doctrine laid down in Salomon’s case has to be watched very carefully. It has 
often been supposed to cast a veil over the personality of a limited company through 
 principle indicating its inviolability was no longer assured.  
Reflecting the differing views of the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords in Salomon, one of the most significant features of the development of 
the corporate disregard case law over the late 20th and early 21st Centuries is 
the repeated inability of the judiciary to agree as to the rationale they see as 
justifying it. In DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets12 for example, 
Lord Denning argued that a group of companies was in reality a single 
economic entity and should be treated as one legal entity. His fellow judges 
Sachs LJ and Karminski LJ carefully shied away from agreeing that broad 
single economic entity rationale.  Two years later the House of Lords in 
Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council13 stated that the veil of incorporation 
would be upheld unless it was a façade. However, in Re a Company14 the Court 
of Appeal again asserted a broader notion of veil lifting: 
 
[i]n our view the cases… show that the court will use its power 
to pierce the corporate veil if it is necessary to achieve justice 
irrespective of the legal efficacy of the corporate structure 
under consideration.15 
 
There was, however, a growing disquiet about the uncertainty this back and 
forth judicial dialogue brought to the concept of corporate personality and 
limited liability.16  
                                                     
which the courts cannot see. But that is not true. The courts can, and often do, pull off the 
mask. They look to see what really lies behind.”  
12 D.H.N. Food Distributors Ltd. v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 32 P 
& CR 240. 
13 Woolfson v Stratthclyde Regional Council [1979] 38 P & CR 521. 
14 Re a Company [1985] 1 BCC 99421. 
15 See also Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v Mardon [1976] 2 W.L.R. 583  
16 See J Lowry. ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil.’ (1993) Journal of Business Law and National 
Dock Labour Board v Pinn and Wheeler Ltd [1989] BCLC 647. 
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This led in 1990 to a review of disregard precedent in Adams v Cape 
Industries17 that attempted to provide a fundamental set of rationale for 
disregarding the corporate form across all areas of law. The Court of Appeal 
concluded that it could do so in only three narrow circumstances: where the 
court is interpreting a statute or a document; where the corporation is a “mere 
façade’ (a la Jones v Lipman) and where an agency relationship exists. The 
court stated with echoes of Lord Halsbury: 
 
[n]either in this class of case nor in any other class of case is 
it open to this court to disregard the principle of Salomon v. 
A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22 merely because it 
considers it just so to do.…we do not accept as a matter of law 
that the court is entitled to lift the corporate veil as against a 
defendant company which is the member of a corporate group 
merely because the corporate structure has been used so as to 
ensure that the legal liability (if any) in respect of particular 
future activities of the group (and correspondingly the risk of 
enforcement of that liability) will fall on another member of 
the group rather than the defendant company. Whether or not 
this is desirable, the right to use a corporate structure in this 
manner is inherent in our corporate law.18 
 
However, despite this strong precedent, consistency seemingly remained 
elusive,19 and by 2013 we were back to familiar territory again with the 
Supreme Court attempting to provide a set of rationales for when corporate 
disregard should occur. 
In Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd20 the case concerned ancillary financial 
relief following divorce proceedings. The central question in the case was 
                                                     
17 Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch 433. 
18 Adams p.538 and 544. 
19 See for example Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd (1993), Raja v Van Hoogstraten 
(2006), Kremen v Agrest (No. 2) [2011] 2 F.L.R. 490. 
20 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd  [2013] 2 AC 415. 
 whether Michael Prest was entitled to eight residential properties (one was the 
matrimonial home) owned by two companies in which he held effective 
controlling shareholdings. A Supreme Court, unusually made up of seven 
judges, unanimously concluded that the corporation could not be disregarded 
in this circumstance given the absence of impropriety. The placing of the 
properties in the companies was unconnected with the breakdown of the 
marriage. Instead, they held that the properties of the companies should be 
transferred to Mrs Prest because they were held by the companies on a 
resulting trust for Mr Prest. However, in discussing the disregard issue 
agreement on exactly when it might occur escaped the Court. As the Court of 
Appeal in Gramsci Shipping Corp v Lembergs21 noted afterwards:  
 
In Prest’s case Lord Sumption (at [28]) identified two 
underlying principles which he called ‘the concealment 
principle’ and ‘the evasion principle’. But Lord Neuberger 
was of the view (at [75] that there is a ‘lack of any coherent 
principle in the application of the doctrine of “piercing the 
corporate veil”’, and Lord Walker’s view (at [106]) was that 
it is not a doctrine in the sense of a coherent principle or rule 
of law but a label. Lady Hale (at [92]) was ‘not sure whether 
it is possible to classify all of the cases in which the courts 
have been or should be prepared to disregard the separate legal 
personality of a company neatly into cases of either 
concealment or evasion’. Absent a principle, further 
development of the law will be difficult for the courts because 
development of common law and equity is incremental and 
often by analogical reasoning. 
 
As a result, cases subsequent to Adams and in turn Prest have at times followed 
as best they could the uncertain precedent.22 
                                                     
21 Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corporation v Recoletos Ltd (Lembergs) [2013] EWCA Civ 
730. 
22 See for example IBM United Kingdom Holdings Ltd v Dalgleish [2018] I.R.L.R. 4. 
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B. Academic Treatments 
The fragmented nature of the doctrine is also reflected in the scholarship 
on corporate disregard.  This may of course be because scholars find getting 
to grips with an area that has such clouded rationales equally as difficult as the 
judiciary. Important scholarship in the area is often found in what are in effect 
extended case notes. The best examples of this have served to punctuate major 
developments and flag future doctrinal paths that are sometimes taken up by 
the judiciary.23 Another distinct approach within corporate disregard 
scholarship are historical papers. Unlike the extended case notes, this form of 
scholarship often focuses on only one aspect of corporate disregard.24    
The post-Adams period has also seen the emergence or re-emergence  of a 
key type of academic commentary, perhaps the antithesis of the idea of their 
being a rational judicial approach to corporate disregard, in what could be 
described as the ”mistake” scholarship.25 In general this literature views the 
House of Lords decision in Salomon as ab initio incorrect. From Kahn–
                                                     
23 See, for example, O Kahn-Freund. “Corporate Entity.” Modern Law Review no. 3 (1940): 
226–28 and Lowry, John. “Lifting the Corporate Veil.” Journal of Business Law no. January 
(1993): 41-42. Other good examples of this type of scholarship are Armour, John, and Simon 
Deakin. “Recent Case. Commentary: The Rover Case (2) -Bargaining in the Shadow of Tupe.” 
Industrial Law Journal 29, no. 4 (2000): 395-402. Friedman, Paul, and Nick Wilcox. “Piercing 
the Corporate Veil.” New Law Journal 56, (2006).  
24 J Payne. “Lifting the Corporate Veil: A Reassessment of the Fraud Exception.” 
Cambridge Law Journal 56, no. 2 (1997): 284-90, R Austin, Corporate Groups, in Ross 
Grantham and Charles Rickett, (Eds) Corporate Personality in the 20th Century (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 1998), pp. 71 -89. N Hawke and P Hargreaves. “Corporate Liability: Smoke and 
Mirrors.” International Company and Commercial Law Review 14, no. 2 (2003): 75-82; 
Linklater, Lisa. “Piercing the Corporate Veil -the Never Ending Story.” Company Lawyer 27, 
no. 3 (2006): 65-66. 
25 M Moore. “'A Temple Built on Faulty Foundations': Piercing the Corporate Veil and the 
Legacy of Salomon V. Salomon.” Journal of Business Law no. March (2006): 203 
 Freund’s 1944 description of Salomon as a ‘calamitous’ decision,26 through 
Ireland’s finding of ‘absurdity’ and ‘ossification’,27 to Moore’s ‘temple built 
on faulty foundations’,28 this category has been an important and persistent 
part of the corporate disregard literature over time.29 
Perhaps the most challenging analytical scholarly approach strives to find 
or argue for a single rationale or set of rationales within the corporate disregard 
scholarship. This approach seeks to argue that, despite the doctrine’s vaguery, 
there is or should be a sizable thread or threads of judicial reason running 
through the case law that essentially explains everything. This type of 
scholarship took time to build as early work on corporate disregard tended, 
because of the lack of case law, to focus on statutory inroads into the Salomon 
principle.30 By the 1960s, however, enough case law on corporate disregard 
had built up for Samuels to consider that though separate legal personality has 
been a fundamental principle of company law, the courts have occasionally 
‘lifted’, ‘parted’, ‘torn’, ‘rent’, breached’, or ‘pierced’ the corporate veil.31 By 
the end of that decade Pickering observed that exceptions to corporate 
personality had begun to be described by commentators as ‘lifting the veil’ 
although the phrase was not commonly used by the judiciary to describe their 
                                                     
26 See O Kahn–Freund, Otto, supra n.__ 54-66. 
27 P Ireland. “The Rise of the Limited Liability Company.” International Journal of the 
Sociology of Law, 12 (1984):  239-260.  P Ireland. (1999) Company Law and the Myth of 
Shareholder Ownership. Modern Law Review, 62 (1). pp. 32-57. 
28 M Moore, supra n.__, 180-203 
29 See also P Muchlinski. “Holding Multinationals to Account: Recent Developments in 
English Litigation and the Company Law Review.” Company Lawyer 23, no. 6 (2002): 168–79 
and Collins, Hugh. “Recent Cases. Individual Employment Law. Associated Employers.” 
Industrial Law Journal 18, (1989): 109–12. 
30 C Parry. ‘The Trading with the Enemy Act and the Definition of the Enemy.’ Modern 
Law Review 4, no. 3 (1941): 161-82.  
31 See Samuels, n.__, 107-17. 
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actions at that point.32 In the mid-1970s Schmitthoff claimed that the judicial 
qualifications were so broad that the Salomon decision had ceased to be the 
most important case in company law.33 In 1986 Rixon concluded that the Court 
of Appeal were but ‘a short step to the proposition that the courts may 
disregard Salomon’s case whenever it is just and equitable to do that’.34 
By the late 1980s a distinct sense had emerged within this scholarship that 
the judiciary had lost their way, and attempts began in earnest to provide 
solutions.35 Ziegler and Gallagher set about classifying the various decisions 
and suggested subsuming the categories traditionally proposed for lifting the 
veil (agency, fraud, avoidance of existing obligations) into the one broad 
category–‘prevention of injustice’.36  Ottolenghi similarly examined the 
disregard case law and seemingly found clear categorisations such as: 
‘peeping’, where the veil is lifted to get member information; ‘penetrating’, 
where the veil is disregarded and liability is attributed to the members; 
‘extending’, where a group of companies is treated as one legal entity and; 
‘ignoring’, where the company is not recognised at all.37  
                                                     
32 M Pickering. “The Company as a Separate Legal Entity.” Modern Law Review 31, no. 5 
(1968): 481-511 
33 C Schmitthoff. ‘Salomon in the Shadow.’  (1976) Journal of Business Law 305-12. See 
also Powles, ‘The “See-Through” Corporate Veil’ (1977) 40 The Modern Law Review 339 and 
S Block. ‘The Client Who Behaves as Though Salomons Case Was Wrongly Decided.’ (1978) 
5 International Business Lawyer 119 -24. 
34 F G Rixon. ‘Lifting the Veil between Holding and Subsidiary Companies.’ (1986) Law 
Quarterly Review 415.  For a comparative view of the case law in this period see J M Dobson. 
‘Lifting the Veil in Four Countries: The Law of Argentina, England, France and the United 
States.’ (1986) 35 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 839-63. 
35 Lord Wedderburn, ‘Multinationals and The Antiquities of Company Law’ (1984) 47 
MLR 87.   
36 P Ziegler and L Gallagher. 'Lifting the Corporate Veil in the Pursuit of Justice.' (1990) 
Journal of Business Law ___. 
37 S Ottolenghi. “From Peeping Behind the Corporate Veil, to Ignoring It Completely.” 
(1990) 53 The Modern Law Review 338 -53. 
 To a large extent this classification literature was narrowed by the 
important Court of Appeal decision in Adams v Cape Industries, which itself 
forms a part of this literature both as a response to academic criticism and its 
ability to somehow find from the precedent three clear legitimate rationale (in 
its view) where the courts can disregard the corporate form (Agency, 
Façade/Sham/Shell and interpreting a Contract/Statute). Prest although a  
messier precedent similarly links into this core thread of rationale scholarship.  
Unfortunately none of these judicial or scholarly efforts has moved us 
closer to understanding why a consistent set of rationales for corporate 
disregard seems to escape generations of judges. Our aim in this paper is to 
examine judicial rationales in this area within an empirical framework to 
determine how instrumental they were to the outcome. This should allow us to 
strip away the purely metaphorical and occluded reasoning that seems to be at 
the centre of so much unhappiness with judicial reasoning in the area.  
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Conceptual Framework 
The network of published decisions that form the core of our common law 
has been described as a “gold mine for scientific work.”38 Foreshadowed by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes,39 scholars have deployed a wide variety of techniques 
to extract and analyse data from judicial opinions.  Quite often these 
techniques have origins outside of law, and their importation can generate 
                                                     
38 H Oliphant.  ‘A Return to Stare Decisis.’  (1928) 14 A.B.A. J. 161. 
39 O W Holmes.  ‘The Path of the Law.’  (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 469. 
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challenges that are symptomatic of such interdisciplinary endeavours.40 Other 
kinds of challenges emanate from the judicial opinions themselves.  As Karl 
Llewellyn cautiously prescribed, “finding out what the judges say is but the 
beginning of your task.  You will have to take what they say and compare it 
with what they do.”41 The problem is not simply a matter of interpretation, 
because “[w]e have no way of knowing exactly what the facts were that were 
in sight of the judges who have participated in preparing opinions, nor do we 
know exactly what was in their minds and hearts.”42  Moreover, even the 
simplest dispute affords some measure of “weak” discretion to a judge 
concerning the application of the relevant law to a set of facts.43  The exercise 
of such discretion typically transpires in a manner that is beyond the ken of 
litigants or the public, prompting some to contend that “the judge’s art, when 
greatly practiced, is far too subtle to be measured by any existing behavioural 
technique.”44 Others have even contended that judicial decisions are simply a 
quasi-rationalised discretionary story.45 While one may question whether such 
a broad, cynical acknowledgement is warranted, it would be naïve to believe 
that aspects of a case are never omitted or selectively presented within an 
                                                     
40 See A L Tyree. ‘Fact Content Analysis of Case Law:  Methods and Limitations.’  (1981) 
22 Jurimetrics 1-3. 
41 K N Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush:  On Our Law and Its Study (4th ed. 1973):  14. 
42 R C Lawlor.  ‘Fact Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions.’  (1968) 8 Jurimetrics 107-
08. 
43 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977):  31-33. 
44 W Mendelson.  ‘The Neo-Behavioral Approach to the Judicial Process:  A Critique.’ 
(1963) 57 American Political Science Review 602-03. 
45 M A  Hall and R F Wright.  ‘Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions.’  (2008) 
96 California Law Review 100 (quoting A Juliano and S J Schwab. ‘The Sweep of Sexual 
Harassment Cases.’  (2001) 86 Cornell Law Review 558-59). “[t]here is no reason to expect that 
. . . opinions should provide complete, objective, and result-neutral statements of all the facts in 
each case.  Instead, there is every reason to think just the opposite.  Therefore, content analysts 
must acknowledge that a “judicial opinion is the judge’s story justifying the judgment . . . .” 
 opinion to support its ultimate holding. The possibility that such undercurrents 
could be within a dataset thus can compromise its predictive value. 
Nevertheless, this type of data from judicial opinions can be valuable.  
Mark Hall and Ronald Wright, for instance, have asserted that content analysis 
 
is better suited to studying judicial reasoning itself, 
retrospectively.  Scholars can use the method to learn more, 
for instance, about how results are justified . . . [and] is 
perhaps more relevant to...seeking a measurable 
understanding of substantive law or the legal process.46 
 
Classical content analysis typically involves the coding and counting of 
frequency with which certain phenomena appear in documents.47  For instance, 
content analysis of judicial opinions can reveal patterns that may evince 
whether the law has been applied consistently, judicial discretion has been 
exercised impactfully, uncertainly or some other aspect about adjudication.   
 
B. Rationale Analyses 
Within the rapidly expanding universe of empirical legal studies corporate 
disregard has a singular place.  Nowhere has there been more sustained 
examination of a remedial measure and how it has been applied by courts 
around the world.  This perhaps can be attributed to the doctrine itself, which 
courts have seemingly struggled to articulate in a clear and consistent manner.  
In a similar fashion academics have experimented with various ways to 
                                                     
46 Id. at 98. 
47 L Webley.  ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research.’  The Oxford 
Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer, eds., 2010):  941. 
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examine corporate disregard, and specifically with respect to the rationales that 
courts have proffered as justification for their ultimate holdings. 
The path to all empirical studies of corporate disregard begins with Robert 
Thompson’s analysis of American cases.48  The overall results and parameters 
of his path-breaking work have been canvassed quite thoroughly, but far less 
attention has been directed to his work compiling the rationales behind the 
decisions. From an examination of prior research of the fragmented doctrine 
as well as his own dataset, Thompson created a list of 85 possible rationales, 
which he organised into the following categories: 
 
undercapitalization; 
failure to follow corporate formalities; 
overlap of corporate records, functions or personnel; 
misrepresentation; 
shareholder domination; 
intertwining and lack of substantive separation; 
use of the conclusory terms “alter ego” and “instrumentality”; 
the general ground of fairness; 
assumption of risk; 
refusal to let a corporation pierce itself; 
statutory policy.49 
 
                                                     
48 R B Thompson.  ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil:  An Empirical Study.’  (1991) 76 Cornell 
Law Review 1036. 
49 Id. at 1045-46. 
 Data then were compiled on the number of cases in which a court mentioned 
either the absence or presence of each factor, as well as the frequency with 
which that mention correlated with an ultimate decision whether or not to 
disregard the corporate form.50  This same approach has been adopted by other 
studies of American51 and Australian52 corporate disregard cases.  
While revealing in numerous respects, the frequency data also have limits.  
For instance, in his own study of English corporate disregard cases, Charles 
Mitchell elected not to compile any data on judicial rationales.53  According to 
Mitchell, in disregard cases, rationales are mentioned primarily to reinforce 
“the courts’ own disinclination to describe a set of principles by reference to 
which their decisions on the point should be taken,” leaving adjudication of 
corporate disregard claims to the mercy and whims of judicial discretion.54  
Moreover, the court’s decision may rest on multiple grounds, which may vary 
in their weight and whose effects, therefore, can be difficult to disentangle; as 
Fred McChesney has noted, “[s]imply registering the presence or absence of 
certain factors in the cases cannot disclose the relative importance of each 
factor individually.”55 
One option to redress these concerns is to examine all the various 
rationales with multiple regression analysis.  John Matheson, for instance, has 
                                                     
50 Id. at 1063-64. 
51 See J H Matheson.  ‘The Modern Law of Corporate Groups:  An Empirical Study of 
Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary Context.’  (2009) 87 North Carolina Law 
Review 1112-13.  J H Matheson.  ‘Why Courts Pierce:  An Empirical Study of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil.  (2010) 7 Berkeley Business J. 12-13. 
52 IM Ramsay and DB Noakes, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia’ (2001) 19 C&SLJ 
250. 
53 E-mail from Charles Mitchell, (on file with author). 
54 Mitchell, supra note __, at 15. 
55 F S McChesney.  ‘Doctrinal Analysis and Statistical Modeling in Law:  The Case of 
Defective Incorporation.’  (1993) 71 Washington University Law Quarterly 515-19. 
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used logistic regression to analyse thousands of American veil-piercing 
cases.56  But the technique may not be suitable when, as is the case here, the 
data pool is considerably smaller; moreover, this sort of statistical analysis still 
can be limited if the underlying data tabulate mere mentions of factors, rather 
than when a particular factor was truly instrumental to the court’s ultimate 
decision. 
Another strategy that has been proposed is algorithmic text analysis.  
According to Jonathan Macey and Joshua Mitts, an algorithm can be used to 
identify the rationales that best predict judicial outcomes.57 According to them, 
the use of such automated methods avoids the “substantial subjectivity and 
arbitrariness” of manual coding, which involves elements of judgment about 
how certain data should be classified and entered,58 and instead represents a 
“more replicable and objective [approach] than prior empirical studies on veil 
piercing.”59 This of course misses the point that statistical algorithms are the 
product of human design and coding and simply automate the decisions of 
Macey and Mitts.60 Using technology does not produce a neutral truth.61 
Additionally their algorithmic study represents only a slice of the entire 
universe of American disregard cases, in particular, because Macey and Mitts 
acknowledge that they excluded conslusory metaphorical rationales such as 
                                                     
56 See supra note 39. 
57 J Macey and J Mitts.  ‘Finding Order in the Morass:  The Three Real Justifications for 
Piercing the Corporate Veil.’  (2014) 100 Cornell Law Review 113. 
58 Id. at 112. 
59 Id. at 140. 
60 M Broussard (2018) Artificial Unintelligence, MIT Press pages 1-39. 
61 Dignam, Alan J., Artificial Intelligence: The Very Human Dangers of Dysfunctional 
Design and Autocratic Corporate Governance (May 3, 2019). Queen Mary School of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 314/2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382342  
 alter ego.62 However sliced, Macey and Mitts’ database is constructed 
differently than those within other American content studies, particularly those 
that did not use any sampling techniques and instead thoroughly compiled each 
and every case within a defined timespan.63 
And these differences matter.  As many commentators–including Macey 
and Mitts themselves–have observed, the domain of corporate disregard is 
notoriously replete with conclusory, metaphorical language that has become 
part of the doctrinal tests applied by courts.64 Precisely because they are 
proxies for deeper rationales, these metaphors should, in our view, be part of 
any examination of judicial reasoning; and, indeed, such terms comprise a 
significant part of the datasets of other common law empirical veil-piercing 
studies.  The decision by Macey and Mitts to “filter out” such phrases at the 
outset both illustrates the point that technological neutrality was not present 
and generates a dataset that probably omits large swaths of relevant cases and 
likely precludes any meaningful comparison of results with other studies.65 
 
C. Our Study 
 
We have taken a different approach towards analysing judicial rationales.  
The results here are filtered from an initial data set of 909 cases down to a final 
                                                     
62 Id. at 147-48.   
63 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note __. 
64 D Millon.  ‘The Still-Elusive Quest to Make Sense of Veil-Piercing.’  (2010) 89 Texas 
Law Review See Also 20, 29. “[t]he metaphorical factors are notoriously uninformative.  Thus, 
for example, some cases say that if a corporation is a mere “alter ego” of its shareholder it is a 
basis for piercing.... Metaphors . . . serve as little more than window dressing for fairness or 
policy considerations that are rarely articulated clearly” 
65 Cf. Hall & Wright, supra note __, at 97. 
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dataset of 213 UK corporate disregard cases ranging from 1885 up to and 
including 2014.66 The cases come from Westlaw,67 LexisNexis,68 various print 
sources, and Charles Mitchell’s 1999 English study.69  In drawing the cases 
from the online sources we used four search phrases:  ‘disregard! /s (entity 
entities)’, ‘pierc! /s veil’, ‘lift! /s veil’, and ‘Salomon /s Salomon.’70   
Cases were then examined by both authors for relevance and only cases 
with a meaningful disregard outcome were included in the final data set. 
Within that filtering, preliminary interlocutory matters or jurisdiction issues 
were not included where they did not reflect reliable outcomes or reasoning.71  
Similarly, cases where corporate disregard was potentially engaged but the 
judge eliminated it from consideration were not included.72  Reverse-
piercing,73 successor liability,74 and transfers within bankruptcy,75 were also 
eliminated despite their doctrinal links.  
The cases within the final dataset then were coded manually by each 
author separately and agreed together.  A range of factual information about 
each case was collected, such as the year of decision and whether the corporate 
form was disregarded.  In cases where a court applied separate analysis to 
different co-defendant corporations or individuals, we created separate entries 
                                                     
66 Searches by decade begin in 1885. Cases begin with Farrar v Farrars Ltd [1888] 40 Ch 
D 395.  
67 ‘UK Reports All’ database, beginning 1865. 
68 ‘UK Cases Combined Courts’ database, beginning 1558. 
69 See C. Mitchell, supra n.__, 24-28.   
70 The exclamation mark within our search terms is a wildcard that nets different 
permutations of a term. 
71 But see C. Mitchell, supra n.__, 24 table 8. 
72 For example Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] 1 WLR 3111. 
73 See, In re H. R. Harmer Ltd [1959] 3 All ER 689 (Q.B.). 
74 See, Davis v Elsby Bros [1959] 1 WLR 170. 
75 See, Gonville’s Trustee v Patent Caramel Co [1912] 1 KB 599. 
 for the same opinion,76 so there are 213 cases within the data set but 216 
observations. Information about the specific Court, division, and subdivision 
were compiled and whether the decision was trial, intermediate appellate, or 
supreme level. 
Information was also collected about the substantive claim as to whether 
a corporate disregard request lay in contract, criminal, fraud/deception, 
statutory, or tort law. Where multiple substantive claims were present, any of 
which may relate to a court’s ultimate disposition, we recorded all of the 
substantive claims within a case on a non-exclusive basis. 
As we noted earlier, the area of corporate disregard has over its history 
been permeated by conclusory, metaphorical terms, such as lifting, peeping, 
and piercing, which have been used at times by the judiciary in confusing and 
obfuscating ways.77 Interpreting the instrumental meaning of a rationale within 
each case is therefore vital. According to David Millon, 
 
[i]f the asserted rationales are actually uninformative, the real 
challenge is to figure out what kinds of acts really motivate 
courts to pierce the corporate veil.  This would require a case-
by-case reading of the facts of each piercing decision in order 
to discern just what it is that triggers the court’s belief (or 
perhaps just intuition) that the corporation’s shareholders 
have acted improperly.78 
 
This is the approach that has been taken in one study of American veil-piercing 
cases,79 and is the one that we have used here. 
                                                     
76 See, for example, Yukong Lines Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corp. [1998] 
BCC 870, which involves two different types of shareholders. 
77 See Lord Sumption’s view on this in Petrodel Resources Ltd v Prest [2013] 2 AC 415, 
8. 
78 Millon, supra note __, at 23. 
79 P Oh.  ‘Veil-Piercing.’  (2010) 89 Texas Law Review 81. 
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Each case within our dataset was read carefully to determine the rationales 
that appeared instrumental to a court’s ultimate decision whether or not to 
disregard the corporate form.  This encompasses all instances in which the 
court noted that evidence, a factor, or some other kind of justification was 
absent or present; and when multiple instrumental rationales were present 
within a case, they were all recorded.  We used a total of fourteen categories 
of instrumental rationales, selected on the basis of appearance within our UK 
cases:  Agency, Alter Ego, Assumption of Risk, Commingling, 
Control/Domination, Deception, Façade/Sham/Shell, Informalities, 
Injustice/Unfairness, Instrumentality, Siphoning of Funds, Statutory 
Interpretation, Undercapitalization, and Other.  For certain rationales, 
subcategories were used.  Commingling was divided into whether it involved 
assets, employees/officers, records/taxes.  Deception was divided into whether 
it concerned Fraud/Deceit, Assets, or the Identity of the shareholder. 
Our rationale data are the product of a subjective process.  Unlike 
Thompson’s and Matheson’s studies, we did not collect data on whether a 
rationale was merely mentioned within a corporate disregard opinion.  And, 
unlike Macey and Mitts’ study, we did not look for specific textual phrases or 
use any kind of algorithmic approach.  Instead, we did what lawyers seeking 
to understand the law of corporate disregard would do:  read opinions carefully 
and assess whether reasons cited by a court are instrumental to the corporate 
disregard outcome.  However, as discussed earlier there is no way to discern 
entirely whether the publicly articulated  rationales cited by a court truly are 
the driving instrumental reasons for the outcome. Metaphors in particular are 
 by their very nature chosen to provide a shape for an explanation but without 
providing exact detail. As such, the disregard rationales we capture may 
operate similarly to a Rorschach test whereby articulated rationales reveal 
information about judicial deliberation, whether conscious or unconscious; for 
instance, recurring specific rationales, such as fraud/deception, may indicate 
preferred evidence, whereas conclusory metaphors, such as alter ego, may 
indicate a lack of evidence or complete evidence for the ultimate decision.  
There are, of course, other limitations to our study’s design.  Because our 
dataset concerns only judicial opinions, our results do not capture the dynamics 
of cases that never reached final disposition, and so the portrait is but a part of 
the overall population of corporate disregard litigation.  Moreover, the cases 
within our dataset may be susceptible to selection bias,80  and so we may be 
presenting results involving issues, litigants, and resources that might not be 
representative of all potential disputes.  But, without access to any non-filed 
or settled matters, these publicly available cases are currently the best means 
for acquiring systematic insight into judicial reasoning.   
 
IV. RESULTS 
The results presented here should be read with great care.  Unlike other 
studies, the frequency data should not be interpreted as reporting simply the 
total number of cases in which a rationale was mentioned by a court in our 
dataset; rather, the frequency data reflect the number of times in which a 
                                                     
80 See G. L. Priest and B. Klein ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’ (1984) 13 J Legal 
Stud 1. 
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rationale was deemed to be instrumental–either in its articulated absence or 
presence within a case– to an ultimate decision whether or not to disregard the 
corporate form.  Further, the disregard rate provided for each rationale should 
not be compared to the overall corporate disregard rate of 35.65% for our entire 
case dataset; the disregard rate for each rationale instead reflects its propensity 
or weight towards whether a corporate disregard claim was successful or not. 
For example in Table 1A below, the courts articulated Façade/Sham/Shell 69 
times as a rationale that was instrumental to an outcome. The disregard rate 
for Façade/Sham/Shell of 27.54% means that it was articulated by the court as 
instrumental in disregarding the corporate form in only 27.54% of cases and 
that conversely in 72.46% of cases the court articulated that its absence was 
instrumental to a no disregard outcome that upheld the corporate form.   
Table 1A presents data on the frequency and disregard rate for each 
rationale within our UK dataset, with disregard rates in excess of 50.00% 
appearing in bold. 
 
 Table 1A. Frequency and Disregard Rate by Rationale81 
 Rationale n Disregard Rate 
Agency 20 30.00% 
Alter Ego 17 58.82% 
Assumption of Risk 2 0.00% 
Commingling 14 64.29% 
Assets 12 58.33% 
Employees/Officers 3 100.00% 
Records/Taxes 3 66.67% 
Control/Domination 51 54.90% 
Deception 43 32.56% 
Fraud/Deceit 30 26.67% 
Assets 3 33.33% 
Identity 11 45.45% 
Façade/Sham/Shell 69 27.54% 
Informalities 1 100.00% 
Injustice/Unfairness 15 46.67% 
Instrumentality82 12 66.67% 
Siphoning of Funds 10 60.00% 
Statutory Interpretation 35 42.86% 
Undercapitalization 3 100.00% 
Other 36 25.00% 
 
Façade/Sham/Shell is the rationale that was instrumental in the largest number 
of cases; this is hardly a surprise, given that it is one of the most clearly and 
consistently articulated categories for corporate disregard over the past 
century, and is one of the categorical rationales authorised by the Adams 
decision.83  Interestingly, the rationale also features a low 27.54% disregard 
rate.  That rate is the lowest among any of the rationales except for the Other 
                                                     
81 The frequency of rationales may differ than that of sub-category rationales, because the 
presence of multiple sub-category rationale within a case were recorded as only one instance of 
that rationale being instrumental to the court’s decision whether to disregard the corporate form. 
82 Instrumentality refers to a rationale expressed regarding the corporate form as an 
"conduit" or  "vehicle," or some other means for perpetuating a wrong.  The common thread 
among this rationale revolves around the use of a murky instrumental metaphor that summarily 
refers to intentional mis-use of the corporate form. 
83 See Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch. 935; Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832; 
Prest v Petrodel [2013].  See also infra Fig. 2A. 
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category, which contains very diffuse rationales that resist generalisation.84 
Despite its apparent diminution in the Adams case, Injustice has a persistency 
within the data and its 46.67% rate suggests that it is not the arbitrary get out 
of (corporate disregard) jail card suggested in the literature, but rather more 
finely balanced and uncertain within the case law.85  
Breaking the data down further, Figure 1 below depicts the disregard rate 
for each rationale, with the black bars indicating rates below 50.00%, that is, 
skewing towards the rationale’s absence justifying a rejection of the corporate 
disregard request.  Only three other rationales feature disregard rates 
comparable to that of Façade/Sham/Shell:  Agency (30.00%), Assumption of 
Risk (0.00%), and Deception (32.56%). 
 
FIGURE 1. DISREGARD RATE BY RATIONALE 
 
                                                     
84 See infra Tbl. 1A. 
85 See F G Rixon. ‘Lifting the Veil between Holding and Subsidiary Companies.’ (1986) 
Law Quarterly Review 415 and Lowry, John. “Lifting the Corporate Veil.” Journal of Business 































Assumption of Risk may be discounted on the basis of its infrequency, but the 
other rationales—along with Façade/Sham/Shell—are commonly mentioned 
by courts to be circumstances when disregard of the corporate form could 
occur.  For example an overall disregard rate for a rationale that leans toward 
0.00% suggests a tendency that the rationale’s absence should result in no 
disregard; and when the rationale leans towards 100%, that suggests a high, 
but not absolute, degree of judicial consensus that the presence of that rationale 
will result in disregard. The low disregard rates for this cluster of rationale 
indicate that their absence from a case frequently results in preservation of the 
corporate form.  Put differently, the data suggest that Agency, Deception and 
Façade/Sham/Shell are considered essential elements in a significant number 
of corporate disregard requests.  
If we take a macro view of the rates in terms of judicial consensus then 
within the data a 0-40% disregard rate indicates a fair degree of judicial 
consensus as to how that rational is adjudicated, 41-60% indicates a degree of 
uncertain adjudication and 61%-100% again indicates a degree of consensus 
in adjudication. Eliminating rationales with low numbers such as 
Undercapitalisation (3), Informalities (1) and Assumption of risk (2) leaves 11 
rationales with meaningful frequency within the data. Overall in terms of their 
certainty of adjudication matters look finely balanced with 6 rationales in the 
certain range and 5 in the uncertain range. Interestingly of the 6 rationales in 
the certain range 4 tilt towards upholding the corporate form and 2 towards a 
disregard outcome in terms of their rates. This would seem to accord with the 
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overall picture of uncertainty within the wider academic and judicial 
commentaries.  
However, dividing the rationales by numerical frequency yields a different 
picture. We organised the 11 remaining rationales into a spectrum of low 
frequency (0-19), mid-frequency (20-39), and high frequency (40+) rationales.   
From that breakdown three high frequency rationales are present, 
Control/Domination, Deception and Façade/Sham/Shell. Deception and 
Façade/Sham/Shell have low rates and therefore a high degree of certainty and 
judicial consensus as to the overall direction of adjudication. 
Control/Domination is the only high frequency rationale that has an uncertain 
judicial consensus as to its adjudication. In percentage terms 68.71% of the 
time a high frequency rationale is instrumental to an outcome it is within the 
certain range of judicial adjudication and strongly tilts towards a no-disregard 
outcome. The three categories in the mid frequency range, Statutory 
Interpretation, Agency and Other similarly have two with low rates indicating 
judicial consensus and one, Statutory Interpretation, is uncertain but only just. 
Again within the mid-frequency we can observe that in percentage terms 
61.53% of the time a mid frequency rationale is instrumental to an outcome, it 
is within the certain range of judicial adjudication and strongly tilts towards a 
no-disregard outcome. Within the five low frequency rationales of Alter Ego, 
Comingling, Injustice, Instrumentality, and Siphoning only two, Comingling 
and Instrumentality, have rates that indicate a degree of certainty of judicial 
adjudication. The other three have rates in the uncertain range. In percentage 
terms where a low frequency rationale is instrumental to an outcome, it is 
 within the certain range of judicial adjudication only 38.23% of the time and 
contrary to the mid and high frequency rationales tilts towards a disregard 
outcome. Viewed as a whole this is not a picture of uncertainty of adjudication 
or direction of outcome as there is overall a high degree of certainty of 
adjudication and direction of outcome in the mid to high frequency rationales 
which declines in the low frequency range. Given this finding the slippery 
reputation of disregard adjudication may be overstated. Academic and judicial 
commentaries of the area may be disproportionally emphasising the 
uncertainty from minority rationales and perhaps not recognising that a 
disregard outcome, for example strongly rationalised as a Façade/Sham/Shell 
or Deception situation is not generally an unstructured messy judicial decision.   
Moreover, our dataset confirms that Façade/Sham/Shell and 
Deception/Fraud have become increasingly prominent rationales, notably 
since the Adams decision. 
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FIGURE 2A. FREQUENCY OF CASES & 
RATIONALES WITH LOW DISREGARD RATES OVER TIME 
 
 
Figure 2A provides a time-based comparison of the frequency with which 
Agency, Deception, and Façade/Sham/Shell have been instrumental 
rationales; as a point of reference, the number of cases within our dataset for 
each decade is supplied in connection with the scale on the right-hand side of 
the graph.  Agency has ebbed and flowed rather steadily over the decades, and 
thus its presence has diminished given the increase in the number of cases.  In 
contrast Deception and Façade/Sham/Shell mirrored each other in the decade 
after Adams v Cape Industries Plc,86 steadily increasing in proportion to the 
number of cases. Deception’s rise is puzzling and seems to have been related 
to the Adams decision, where perhaps the narrowing of disregard categories 
may have caused litigants to place more emphasis on deception elements of an 
                                                     















 action. However, Deception sharply declines after the new millennium, while 
FaçadSham/Shell continued to increase. Similarly, as Figures 2A above, and 
B, C, below illustrate, while Façade/Sham/Shell had been increasing in 
frequency over the course of the 1980s it accelerates rapidly after the 
narrowing of other rationales and its legitimisation by Adams in 1990. This 
may also explain its low overall disregard rate as it may be that its frequency 
increase is partly because with the narrowing of acceptable categories it 
became a catchall quasi-metaphorical rational for litigants. In simple terms 
after Adams the proposition may have been put more and more that some 
element of a case fits within the façade rationale and in turn the courts found 
that while it is a legitimate rationale it is not present in the vast majority of 
cases where it is claimed to be present.  
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The impact of Adams can be observed closely in Figure 2B above where we 
consider the key rationales the case legitimised and one key category it 
dismissed.87 As we have noted, Façade/Sham/Shell experiences an 
extraordinary increase in frequency immediately after Adams. But the 
rationale interestingly has a low 27.54% disregard rate, and thus strongly tends 
to be instrumental in its absence.  By comparison Statutory Interpretation also 
is cited by courts more frequently after Adams, but then declines after the new 
millennium; and the 42.86% disregard rate indicates that Statutory 
Interpretation is a more finely balanced rationale which slightly tilts towards 
being instrumental in its absence. The increase in Statutory Interpretation’s 
frequency may be due to its becoming a specific rationale category after Adams 
within which judges felt safe articulating on disregard, while its fine balance 
indicates its discretionary nature. Agency as a category of disregard rationale 
increases slightly in the decade after Adams and as with Statutory 
Interpretation declines in the new millennium.  As with Façade/Sham/Shell, 
Agency is highly instrumental in its absence, with a 30% disregard rate. Unlike 
the more metaphorical Façade/Sham/Shell, the Agency rationale articulated in 
Adams is very specific, which may explain why, despite its articulated 
legitimacy in Adams, it does not have the explosive growth observed in 
Façade/Sham/Shell.   
Injustice/Unfairness was a key rationale category that was specifically 
disapproved of in the Adams case and yet rises in frequency over the decade 
                                                     
87 The Court of Appeal in Adams also dismissed Lord Denning’s Single Economic Entity 
proposition for corporate disregard as having never reached a sufficient degree of judicial 
consensus to have any legitimacy.  
 after Adams and remains an important if low frequency category in the rest of 
the decade data. Its 46.67% disregard indicates a finely balanced category in 
terms of injustice being found present or absent by the judiciary and again 
highlights a discretionary interpretable nature. The fact it is finely balanced 
and remains a persistent category may, along with the metaphorical categories, 
contribute to the observations, both judicial and academic, about the ambiguity 
of rationale present in the area of corporate disregard. 
 
FIGURE 2C. FREQUENCY OF CASES & 
“METAPHORICAL” RATIONALES OVER TIME 
 
 
As compared to other conclusory, metaphorical rationales,  
Façade/Sham/Shell is the only high frequency one and it enjoys a conspicuous 
increase over time. In that sense it is unusual both generally and specifically 
within the metaphorical rationales. This may be because while Adams 
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circumstance present in cases such as Jones v Lipman so in effect using a 
metaphorical wrapper to legitimise a specific set of circumstance that are far 
from uncertain.   
There were, however, some patterns among the rationales that exhibited 
relatively high disregard rates. When courts focused on specific, concrete 
evidence, such as the Commingling of Assets (58.33%) and Siphoning of 
Funds (60.00%), the outcome leaned more towards disregard of the corporate 
form; but this also applied to the conclusory rationales, Alter Ego (58.82%) 
and Instrumentality (66.67%). This may indicate that concrete evidence based 
rationales have high rates of disregard where that evidence is present and that 
conclusory low frequency highly metaphorical rationales outside the approved 
Adams category of Façade/Sham/Shell, where the metaphorical aspect is 
reduced, have high rates for exactly the opposite reason that there is no 
concrete evidence and the metaphor is occluding whatever the real reason is. 
Again it may be that this contrast is one of the reasons the area is regarded as 
problematic but again that problematic occluding metaphorical aspect is 
focused within only two low frequency rationales.88 
Table 1A below provides the disregard rates for sub-sets of the Statutory 
Interpretation and Other rationales.   
                                                     
88 The dichotomy between Deception and Undercapitalization is also 
notable.  The low disregard rate for Deception (32.56%) applied to most of its 
sub-sets, Fraud/Deceit (26.67%), Assets (33.33%), and Identity (45.45%).  But 
is to be contrasted with Undercapitalization, which was an infrequent rationale, 
but featured a 100.00% disregard rate.  The discrepancy is notable because of 
a persistent debate among commentators about whether undercapitalization is 
a serviceable proxy for Deception that would warrant disregard of the 
corporate form. UK courts appear to be in agreement that inadequate 
capitalization alone is an acceptable justification for corporate disregard. 
 
  
Table 1A. Rationale Sub-Category Frequency and Disregard Rate89  
 Rationale n90 Disregard Rate 
Statutory Interpretation 35 42.86% 
Commercial  2 0.00% 
Corporate  2 0.00% 
Criminal  5 80.00% 
Discrimination  1 0.00% 
Employment  4 25.00% 
Film  1 100.00% 
Health  1 0.00% 
Housing  3 33.33% 
Intellectual Property  1 100.00% 
International  1 0.00% 
Marital  2 50.00% 
Maritime  1 100.00% 
Real Property  9 33.33% 
Tax  2 100.00% 
Other 36 25.00% 
Abuse/Impropriety  1 100.00%  
Beneficial Owner  10 30.00% 
Collateral Proceeding  1 100.00% 
Consent/Contract  3 33.33% 
Constructive Trust  2 0.00% 
Director Liability  4 0.00% 
Harm  1 0.00% 
                                                     
89 Neither of these groupings permits any reliable generalisations about the categorical 
rationale, but a few interesting points are worth noting.  The Statutory Interpretation category 
comprises a diverse range of subject matter which means at the granular level of sub-category 
there is a small numbers problem. As such, it tells us very little except observing the extreme 
nature of the disregard rate outcomes where 9 of the 14 sub categories have either a 0% or a 
100% disregard rate. This extremity may indicate the extent of the discretion present in this 
category. The breadth of statutory types, though, may relate to its status as a legitimate 
rationale in the Adams case and indicates that courts entertain corporate disregard requests in a 
wide swath of rather different cases, and that there does not appear to be any kind of consistent 
attribute except the broad extent of judicial discretion that the rationale creates.  
The Other category skews heavily towards a low disregard rate with 8 out of 14 sub-
categories having a 0% disregard rate and 4 others having an approximate low 30% rate. Many 
of these cases were not decided on solitary grounds, but often in connection with a finding that 
there was insufficient evidence of the corporate form being a Façade/Sham/Shell. 
90 See supra note 85.  
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Incidental  3 33.33% 
Injunctive Policy  3 33.33% 
Jurisdiction  2 50.00% 
Minority Interest  1 0.00% 
Sole Proprietor  1 0.00% 
Sufficiency of Evidence 2 0.00% 
Third-Party Rights  3 0.00% 
Trial Court’s Decision  1 0.00%  
 
Statutory Interpretation and Other rationales comprise a significant part of our 
overall dataset.  One or both of those rationales appears in 70 cases, or 32.86% 
of our total dataset.  And very few of the rationales within either the Statutory 
Interpretation or Other category seem to be grounded in reasons that can be 
analysed or organised in a systematic fashion. Again this may feed the overall 
perception of an unruly doctrine without perhaps an understanding of the 
breath of circumstances in which the judiciary are working with corporate 
disregard claims. 
  
Table 2. Disregard Rate for Rationales by Jurisdiction 
  Trial Intermediate Supreme  
 Rationale Court    Appellate Court 
Agency 22.22% 37.50% 33.33% 
Alter Ego 42.86% 66.67%  100.00% 
Assumption of Risk 0.00% ---  --- 
Commingling 62.50% 66.67%  --- 
Control/Domination 57.89% 60.00%  28.57% 
Deception 20.00% 47.37%  25.00% 
Façade/Sham/Shell 30.23% 26.09% 0.00% 
Informalities 100.00% --- --- 
Injustice/Unfairness 41.67% 100.00% 50.00% 
Instrumentality 50.00%  100.00% --- 
Siphoning of Funds 60.00%  50.00% --- 
Statutory Interpretation 52.94%  35.29% 0.00% 
Undercapitalization 0.92%  100.00% --- 
Other 22.22% 26.67% 0.00% 
 
 The nature of legal appeal processes has been found to be relevant to disregard 
outcomes in the UK and elsewhere,91 and particularly at the Intermediate 
Appeal level within the UK.92  Similarly we found a pattern of generally higher 
rates of disregard within the rationale categories at the intermediate appellate 
level than trial, where rates of disregard were higher in in 9 of the 12 rationale 
categories where appeals were present. In particular remarkably high rates 
were observed in the Injustice, Instrumentality and Undercapitalization 
rationale categories at the Intermediate Appeal Level. Instrumentality and 
Undercapitalization feature a very small number of observations that account 
for the high volatility between the Trial Court and Intermediate Appellate 
Court levels. This leaves Injustice as a notable but low frequency instrumental 
Intermediate Appellate Court rationale that appears to drive disregard of the 
corporate form outcomes at that level.   
The overall pattern reversed at the Supreme Court level where rates were 
generally much lower across 7 of the 8 rationale categories, where appeals to 
the Supreme Court were present, with only Alter Ego breaking that trend with 
a notable 100% rate. Within the rationale categories Alter Ego, 
Façade/Sham/Shell and Statutory Interpretation stand out as having unusual 
patterns of disregard at each appellate level. The disregard rates for Alter Ego 
rise at the Intermediate Appellate and Supreme Court Levels, which appears 
                                                     
91 C. Mitchell, ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil:  An Empirical Study’ (1999) 3 Company 
Financial & Insolvency L Rev 15 at 20, RB Thompson, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil: An 
Empirical Study’ (1991) 76 Cornell L Rev 1036 at 1050, MF Khimji and CC Nicholls, ‘Piercing 
the Corporate Veil in the Canadian Common Law Courts: An Empirical Study’ (2015) 41 
Queen’s LJ 207, IM Ramsay and DB Noakes, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia’ (2001) 
19 C&SLJ 250. 
92 See Mitchell above and A. Dignam and PB Oh (2019) Disregarding the Salomon 
Principle: An Empirical Analysis, 1855-2014, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 
(2019), pp. 16–49. 
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to have some relationship to this being driven by criminal Alter Ego cases in 
the English Court of Appeal.  However, we could find no such correlation at 
the Supreme Court level that might help explain the 100% disregard rate for 
Alter Ego.  
The disregard rates for both Façade/Sham/Shell and Statutory 
Interpretation drop at both the Intermediate Appellate and Supreme Court 
Levels, which may be because they are Adams categories that may bring a 
greater level of exacting scrutiny. This might also be partly true of Agency 
with its rising and falling pattern. If we return to the disregard rates as 
indicators of certainty/uncertainty of judicial analysis, we find that the Trial 
Courts are relatively uncertain in their adjudication of disregard rationales with 
6 rationale rates from 11 in the uncertain range.93 Intermediate Appellate 
courts have a much higher degree of certainty of adjudication overall with only 
3 rationale rates from 11 in the uncertain category. The Supreme Court had the 
highest level of overall certainty of adjudication with 7 of the 8 rationales 
adjudicated at the Supreme Court Level falling within the certain range.  
If we examine the individual rationale rates by frequency band, as earlier, 
we find some interesting patterns.  Of the three high frequency rationales, 
Control/Domination, Deception and Alter Ego, again we can observe that 
Control/Domination is the only one within the uncertain range at the Trial 
Court level. At the Intermediate Appellate level adjudication becomes more 
uncertain with Control/Domination and Deception falling within the uncertain 
range. At the Supreme Court Level all three are within the certain range. 
                                                     
93 As before eliminating the three low number rationales – Assumption of Risk, 
Informalities and Undercapitalization. 
 Within the three categories in the mid frequency range, Statutory 
Interpretation, Agency and Other, only one, Statutory Interpretation, is in the 
uncertain range. At the Intermediate Appellate and Supreme Court level all 
three were within the certain range.  
Indeed, the analysis by mid and high frequency rationales indicates that 
apart from Control/Domination and Deception at the Intermediate Appellate 
level there is not just a high degree of certainty as to adjudication across 
jurisdiction level but all the certain rationales rates in the high to mid frequency 
at all court levels are in the low percentages, indicating a high degree on 
consensus towards no disregard. In the low frequency rationales of Alter Ego, 
Comingling, Injustice, Instrumentality, and Siphoning, at Trial level matters 
were notably different in that 4 of the 5 were in the uncertain range. At the 
Intermediate Appellate level that switches around with 4 of the 5 in the certain 
range. Notable in the certain range of low frequency rationale rates at the Trial 
and Intermediate Appellate range, is that unlike the mid-high frequency 
rationales all the low frequency rationales in the certain range are high 
percentage rates indicating a consensus towards disregard. At the Supreme 
Court level 2 of the 394 rationale categories adjudicated are within the certain 
range but with no consensus as to disregard or no-disregard.  
Overall there is a high degree of certainty within the adjudication of 
rationales across jurisdiction. In the mid-high frequency rationales at all levels 
of adjudication within the certain rationales there were low disregard rates 
indicating a consensus towards upholding the corporate form. However, two 
                                                     
94 In the low frequency range a small number of cases reached the Supreme Court level.   
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of the high frequency rationales, Control/Domination and Deception, have an 
unusual degree of uncertainty about their adjudication at the Intermediate 
Appellate level which might warrant judicial attention.95 Similarly in the low 
frequency rationales matters were different with a high degree of uncertainty 
at trial court and, apart from the Supreme Court, a tendency within the certain 
rational rates to disregard the corporate form. As noted earlier the reputation 
of corporate disregard for obfuscation and confusion may be overstated or at 
least may only be warranted for rationales such as Control/Domination and 
Deception and the low frequency rationales at the Trial Court level.   
While disregard rationales are expressed within a particular remedial 
context we were also concerned to examine possible contextual elements that 
might relate to the substantive claim within the action. Figure 3 depicts how 
substantive claims were distributed in our dataset. 
 
                                                     
95 Solely in the case of Deception the elevated corporate disregard rate for the 
Intermediate Appellate level is entirely the result of English Court of Appeal decisions, with 
relative parity between its Civil versus non-Civil Divisions. 
 FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS 
 
 
Although Charles Mitchell utilised a more fine-grained set of categories for 
substantive claims,96 we both find a larger number of Contract rather than Tort 
claims, with Statutory claims comprising the largest overall category. 
These proportions, however, do not hold when examined in relation to the 
frequency of different types of instrumental rationales where 
Control/Domination, Deception, and Façade/Sham/Shell form an important 
cluster across all substantive claims. 
 
                                                     
96 Mitchell, supra note __, at 24 (reporting 24 Procedural, 35 Contractual, 18 Tortious, 7 
Equitable Wrongdoing, 7 Admiralty (in rem), 74 Statutory, and 9 Criminal claims). 
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Table 3. Frequency of Rationales by Substantive Claim97 
     Fraud/ 
 Rationale Contract Tort Criminal Deception Statute  
Agency 5 4 4 3 15 
Alter Ego 2 3 3 --- 13 
Assumption of Risk 1  --- --- --- --- 
Commingling 6 1 2 1 7 
Control/Domination 11 7 7 4 38 
Deception 20 1 6 10 23 
Façade/Sham/Shell 35 5 5 11 30 
Informalities --- --- --- --- 1 
Injustice/Unfairness 5 1 --- 2 10 
Instrumentality 6 1 1 2 4 
Siphoning of Funds 2 2 --- 2 5 
Statutory Interpretation 3 1 5 --- 35 
Undercapitalization 2 --- --- --- 1 
Other 14 7 1 7 17 
 
As Table 3 above shows, courts cite Agency, Alter Ego, Siphoning of Funds a 
comparable number of times with respect to all non-Statutory claims; put 
differently, these rationales appear to be disproportionately underrepresented 
with respect to Contract and Criminal claims.  By way of contrast, 
Control/Domination, Deception, and Façade/Sham/Shell all seem to be cited 
roughly in proportion to the distribution of substantive claims within our 
dataset, which may suggest that that these factors tend to be more relevant 
regardless of what kind of substantive claim underlies a corporate disregard 
request. 
                                                     
97 Here we are reporting the number of instances in which rationales appear in relation to 
different types of claims.  For instance, Alter Ego appears in a case with two different claims, 
and so the table depicts that rationale twice -- once under Contract and once under Statutory 
Interpretation..  
 Table 4. Disregard Rate for Rationales by Substantive Claim 
     Fraud/ 
 Rationale Contract Tort Criminal Deception Statute  
Agency 20.00% 25.00% 25.00% 33.33% 33.33% 
Alter Ego 50.00% 66.67% 100.00% --- 61.54% 
Assumption of Risk 0.00% --- --- --- --- 
Commingling 50.00% 100.00% 50.00% 100.00% 71.43% 
Control/Domination 27.27% 71.43% 100.00% 75.00% 60.53% 
Deception 10.00% 0.00% 100.00% 50.00% 39.13% 
Façade/Sham/Shell 28.57% 20.00% 40.00% 54.55% 20.00% 
Informalities --- --- --- --- 100.00% 
Injustice/Unfairness 60.00% 100.00% --- 100.00% 40.00% 
Instrumentality 66.67% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 50.00% 
Siphoning of Funds 50.00% 100.00%  --- 100.00% 40.00% 
Statutory Interp. 0.00% 100.00%  80.00% --- 52.94% 
Undercapitalization 100.00% ---  --- --- 100.00% 
Other 21.43% 14.29% 100.00% 28.57% 27.78% 
 
As Table 4 evinces, the corporate disregard rates for each rationale are not very 
stable across the types of substantive claims. Agency and Façade/Sham/Shell 
have an exceptional status within the data, as they have relatively low 
disregard rates that are roughly consistent across all substantive claims.98  As 
we have noted before, this may be because Agency and Façade/Sham/Shell are 
among the categories established in Adams, although this does not hold for 
another Adams rationale, Statutory Interpretation, whose discretionary nature 
may explain the wide range of disregard rates across substantive claims. 
 Interestingly, as Table 4 below indicates, the disregard rate seems to 
bear a stronger relationship with the type of substantive claim than the 
rationale. The Criminal and Fraud/Deception substantive claim categories 
have for example comparatively high rates and a high degree of certainty of 
adjudication tilting strongly towards a disregard outcome broadly across the 
                                                     
98 The Other category also has a mostly low rate stability. As we noted earlier, it is by its 
nature a catch-all category that inexplicably is skewed towards a low disregard rate overall. 
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instrumental rationales regardless of frequency. Statute as a substantive claim 
has a more mixed picture with a mixed range of rates and a high degree of 
certainty of adjudication tilting towards a no disregard outcome. By frequency 
of rationale that mix of rates is also present.   
Our dataset also features a higher overall disregard rate for most rationales 
in Tort versus Contract. Deception, Façade/Sham/Shell, and Other are 
exceptions in this regard, all of which feature comparatively low disregard 
rates for Tort and Contract. Tort particularly has a distinctive feature if 
analyzed by certainty of adjudication. With its distinctive low and high rates it 
has a remarkable certainty of adjudication across all rationales with a tendency 
towards disregarding the corporate form. Indeed, it is notable that across all 
the rationales by substantive claim there are a high number of rationale rates 
at either end of the certainty of adjudication percentages with not many in the 
uncertain category. Conversely, Contract stands out for the relatively high 
number of rationales in the uncertain category. In terms of the Contract v Tort 
narrative its not just that Tort has an unusually certain relatively uniform 
disregard outcome oriented approach to the adjudication of disregard 
rationales but also that disregard rationales operating in Contract have a higher 
degree of uncertain adjudication.  
Analysis by frequency allows us to focus in on the key differences. In 
Contract in contrast to all the other substantive claims all three high frequency 
rationales (Façade/Sham/Shell, Deception and Control/Domination) are 
uniformly certain in adjudication and in terms of their low rates, a strong 
tendency to uphold the corporate form. In the mid frequency rationales 
 (Statutory Interpretation, Agency and Other) the pattern is exactly the same.  
However, a remarkable amount of uncertainty is present with 4 of the 5 
rationales in the low frequency rationale category (Alter Ego, Instrumentality, 
Comingling, Injustice and Siphoning) having rates within the uncertain 
adjudication range. Overall Contract stands out with its certainty of 
adjudication focused on low rates tilting strongly towards no disregard in the 
mid and high frequency rationales and the remarkable uncertainty found in its 
low frequency rationales. Contrasted with Tort, in terms of mid to high 
frequency rationales, Tort has a more mixed picture with a high degree of 
certainty but less uniform direction of outcome as while the majority of rates 
are at the low end there are also a minority of very high rates. The big 
difference occurs in the low frequency rationales where Tort has remarkably 
high disregard rates.  
Overall, in Contract, the judiciary are much more reluctant to disregard the 
corporate form than where the substantive claim is Tort, Criminal or 
Fraud/Deception, while a more mixed picture exists where Statute is the 
substantive claim. Perhaps the most striking example is Control/Domination, 
where the disregard rate is quite low for Contract (27.27%), and yet extremely 
high for all other remaining substantive claims.  Similarly, as we noted above 
highly elevated corporate disregard rates were present in almost all of the 
rationales for Criminal and Fraud/Deception claims. These results are difficult 
to explain in light of the fact that corporate disregard is a remedy whose 
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rationales should be detached from the nature and dynamics of the underlying 
substantive claim.99  
As such the rationales broadly appear to operate differently depending on 
the nature of the substantive claim, and no overall thread is evident apart again 
from two of the Adams rationale categories of Agency and Façade/Sham/Shell. 
We were unable to detect any statistical patterns that might provide a possible 
answer as to why substantive claims were so significant and would suggest 
that one element the data may be picking up is that some articulated rationales 
are covering a deeper claim specific element to the outcomes such as the 
involuntary nature of Tort and the voluntary nature of Contract.100   
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Our study attempts to establish an empirical foothold within this 
notoriously slippery area of law. We found that overall there is no empirically 
detectable thread of rationales that runs through all disregard claims across the 
vast range of circumstances in which it operates. However, Agency, Deception 
and Façade/Sham/Shell have, over time, become key elements of disregard 
outcomes to the point of becoming a quasi-concrete part of a discernible 
disregard doctrine. In part this is because of the decision in Adams v Cape 
Industries Plc101 which emphasises these rationales or part thereof, along with 
Statutory Interpretation, as legitimate categories of rationale in disregard 
                                                     
99 See, e.g., P Oh.  ‘Veil-Piercing Unbound.  (2013) 93 Boston University Law Review 89. 
100 On the broader impact of contextual elements in disregard cases see A. Dignam and 
PB Oh (2019) above. 
101 Adams & Ors. v Cape Industries Plc [1990] BCC 786. 
 cases. Overall, belying the areas reputation we found a high degree of certainty 
of judicial adjudication within our data, focused on a no-disregard outcome.  
Uncertainty of adjudication, when present, was found when 
Control/Domination and Statutory Interpretation were instrumental and in the 
low frequency rationales. Injustice, although infrequent, was notable for its 
persistence and uncertain adjudication, despite its dismissal as an illegitimate 
rationale in the Adams case.  Statutory Interpretation, Injustice and the 
metaphorical rationales contain by their nature broad discretion or hidden 
discretion and so Control/Domination’s presence in the uncertain category is 
perplexing given it lends itself to more concrete interpretation and points to an 
area that warrants judicial attention. 
Examining rationales by trial jurisdiction we found disregard rates broadly 
higher at the Intermediate Appellate level than at Trial or Supreme Court level. 
This, however, was not the complete picture. When broken down by frequency 
of rationale we found a high degree of certainty of judicial adjudication 
focused on upholding the corporate form. That contradiction is explained by 
two high frequency rationales, Control/Domination and Deception, that were 
uncertain in adjudication at the Intermediate Appellate level, while Injustice 
was also a notable low frequency driver of disregard outcomes at the 
Intermediate Appellate level. Low frequency rationales were again uncertain 
but tilting towards disregard.  
When viewed by substantive claims, apart notably from the Adams 
rationales of Agency and Façade/Sham/Shell, the disregard rates appeared to 
have a stronger link to the underlying substantive claim than the rationale 
expressed, which may indicate an obscured rationale is operating. This may 
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reflect the literature in the area that identifies the often occluded nature of the 
rationale within the case law and provides an empirical signal that the 
rationales may hide a deeper unarticulated rationale related to the core 
circumstance of the substantive claim. As we suggested earlier the broad 
universe of rationales may function as a Rorschach test in which justificatory 
choices reveal information about judicial deliberation, whether conscious or 
unconscious; for instance, recurring specific rationales, such as Deception, 
may reveal patterns of preferred evidence, while firm authorised categories 
such as Agency or Façade/Sham/Shell have similar definitive elements. Other 
conclusory metaphors, such as alter ego, may indicate a lack of sufficient or 
specific support for the ultimate decision necessitating a metaphorical shield 
behind which a deeper rationale lies. At the very least, this observation 
provides insight into what courts believe to be sufficient justifications for the 
public articulation of a disregard outcome.  
Deception was also notably a high frequency rationale, unrelated directly 
to the Adams categories, with remarkable certainty of adjudication that tilted 
strongly towards no-disregard. This suggests that Deception is a core disregard 
rationale, which may relate to a shared absolute judicial underlying equitable 
principle that fraud unravels everything.102  
The empirical picture of corporate disregard found in our study belies its 
reputation for confusion and while we did not find a core single rationale that 
operates universally, we did find a core set of rationale that form the necessary 
                                                     
102 Originating in Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch 196 (CA), the principle is 
discussed extensively with respect to corporate disregard in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd  
[2013] 2 AC 415 paras 18,83 and 89. 
 elements of a large number of disregard adjudications and that certainty of 
interpretation and direction of interpretation towards no-disregard was a 
feature of these core rationale. Uncertainty and confusion was much less of a 
feature than the doctrinal/academic picture portrays, with disregard and no-
disregard outcomes not generally an unstructured mess of obscured judicial 
adjudication. Those features were sometimes present but when present were 
focused on Control/Domination, Statutory Interpretation, the low frequency 
rationales (including Injustice), and the underlying substantive claim link. If 
reform is needed this study would point to those areas as the focus for judicial 
consideration. 
 
 
